The great part about the Internet are the cascading torrents of links which turn the whole thing into an integrated network. Of course, a small number of important sites do a great deal of the shifting through and highlighting, but it's not entirely a top-down system as the original sources are often spotted by topic specialists. The entire enterprise remains hugely dependent on the big newspapers to generate things to complain about.
The process is hugely addictive, certainly for consumers and likely for the intermediaries as well. Pick up the Outrage of the Day, add a political spin, and send on down the line for supporters to fawn and denigrators to be outraged at your having brought up the subject up, having your view, etc. It's like a jolt of crack to see the day's information, get pulled into the argument, weight sides, and scribble nonsense at the other side. Most things people do offer delayed rewards, so it's no surprise to see millions flock somewhere which offers the constant allure of More Stuff To See, more information, more discussion. That incessant flow disguises the fact that people rarely talk about the thing in itself, almost never have the background or understanding of the topic, and so most things are thinly covered politics. But behind all the shallowness that comes with discussing even the most serious of topics you can see even broader dynamics of push-and-pull between broader personalities and outlooks, which do change even if no one ever changes their mind.
One of my personal pet peeves is the autistic understanding of language which happens all around. When people talk in the real world they bring all sorts of implicit meanings behind gestures, phrases, etc. The anonymous and toneless nature of the internet grounds everyone in the literal meaning of words, which greatly impoverishes thought. Take analogies for instance. People make analogies all the time to compare certain aspects of A to certain aspects of B. Any random A, B are likely to have something in common, but when people make this connection they generally mean that something in particular is going on. This is after all how we learn; we link new things to things which we already know. On the Internet, people will generally take the connection out of context, and mock it on face value. People care less about how a statement is interesting than about it's truth value, but people also don't care enough to look up the thing's truth value and instead rely on heuristics.
Broader psychological misunderstandings abound. The urge for firebrands and activists to hear themselves results in a massive overpopulation of fundamentalists of every stripe. Nearly everything on the Internet is reductive. People everywhere search for validation and online they get it through low blows, petty remarks, and swift thrusts. It's as if the place is run by the Oxford Debate Society. The particular psychological rut of conspiracy theories, shallow thought, and general angst make the Interet a very motly but, well, a very "male" place. Despite all the links, it's very antisocial, with very little in the way of relationships or empathy. These aren't gone, however, but come up in the strangest of places.
It's very much like a city in that way, with a blizzard of activity covering up a lack of introspection, memory, and history. What has happened before, what is really going on now, and where things are headed are abandoned as people race to meet the demands of the current cycle. It's like travelling the world with some smart, but not too smart, argumentative friends who have amnesia. I don't know what this is doing to our intelligence, but someday the internet will drop the vicious circles and parlor tricks and become the thing it was meant to be. The problem is not that it's escapist, but that it's not escapist enough and is still bound by the conventions other people set in other media. I want to stumble upon Dutch's blog, see more passive-agressiveness, maybe some irony and parody. Things that don't make sense, complex psychological issues, some other prose than dry and without adjectives. A Russian novel in parts; something jointly written by people across the world.
Wow, it's tough to talk about things in the abstract.










The traditional two-party result in Game Theory makes the assumption that voter preferences lie on a linear continuum. So given any two people, one will be more "left-wing" than the other, and you can find some moderate in between. Parties then jostle for the median voter, and political dominance is unstable.
In reality, the political landscape tends to be more broken up. You have issues like abortion which cleave the electorate. With large population areas, such large Democracies, there tend to be sufficiently many issues that the two parties take on many differing positions and you can effectively think about a "marginal voter" who is torn about which policy preferences should receive greater weight. So any political dominance is always unstable, as the other party can create enough wedge issues to come back.
The problem in smaller political units is that voters are split on fewer issues. Voters tend to be much lower information on local races and go with identity more often. In Chicago for instance, the Daley machine can get at least 60% of the vote in primaries from their vote bank of Irish, immigrants, and other whites. It's hard to compete as another Democrat (let alone a Republican) since Daley serves his base very well (plenty of union and city jobs), and his base is over half the Democrat primary pool. Add to that the fact that city dwellers tend to have relatively uniform social preferences on issues such as abortion, gay marriage, teaching evolution in school, etc.
Similar ethnic divisions are at play in Singapore (Malaysia too). With a large Chinese supermajority, the Lee family makes sure to reward their supporters well. South Africa displays this pattern too, with the ANC commanding the undivided support of a large black base (though high-profile splits in that party might be important).
Explaining this paradox is all about showing why a competing party can't arise in small places while they can in large ones. If you can get >50% of the population to care about a simple set of issues, and then become the best person at providing them with their needs, you have a stable dominant equilibrium even in a democracy.
More interesting perhaps is explaining the long legacy of one-party rule in large and pluralistic democracies like India, Mexico, Taiwan. There the answer also has to do with the costs of building a political machine, and the use of state coercion to tackle political opposition, as well as reputation buildup in the freedom struggle (in India). Information costs in large democracies mean that the scions of politically powerful families start with a heavy stock of reputation capital, explaining the prominence of political dynasties in South Asian Democracies (Gandhi, Bhutto, Zia), and also American and Japanese Democracies.
This is also why you see a greater share of female political leadership in some foreign democracies than in America. In the US, political leaders tend to be drawn from the stock of well-connected lawyers (which is largely male), while in other countries leaders are often drawn from certain families (which are, presumably, half female). Hillary Clinton's rise was only possible from her position in the Clinton family, and Pelosi too is politically well-connected. Just like female rule in those countries, the rise of female politicians here is more a dynastic victory than a feminist one (just like how Queens Elizabeth and Hatshepsut didn't really advance women causes either). People like Merkel, Thatcher, and Mayawati seem like better signs of social progress. But it's also seems easier for women to run in Parliamentary systems rather than in a more direct democracy system. With a Parliament system, you can become a great advocate for your party's views, making you as valuable as any other person, with the added benefits of tokenism. When you're running for election among real people, you also have to deal with certain stereotypes. Successful female candidates always seem to behave hyper-masculinely (Clinton, Thatcher, M from Bond) or very nurturing and non-threatening (Palin, Sheila Dixit), but they have the advantage that it's harder to attack them without looking bad. Widespread acceptance of female leaders is going to take a bit.
I suspect that as China goes democratic, it will also follow a one-party democracy. Running political operations in all Chinese states is very expensive, so a single party can take advantage of economies of scale. Meanwhile, there is a relative population homogeneity and relative policy consensus. Most political disagreements center on personality differences between rival power cliques, which currently takes place behind closed doors but could easily be democratically decided. The government is very popular and would easily win elections; popular pressures already determine much of state policy. The big difference might be on foreign policy, in which a democratically elected government would be constrained into acting more hawkish on a world stage to save face domestically. Economic policy would also probably become more distorted through the influence of rent-seeking interest groups. On the plus side, voting out incumbents is a great way to let of political steam. Right now this is taken care of by the occasional execution or firing of the designated fall-guys, but if conditions are bad enough you want the guy at the top to change too.