Showing posts with label banking. Show all posts
Showing posts with label banking. Show all posts

Monday, January 2, 2012

More on Repos

After my last post on this, I went to look up some more facts on the repo market. This issue concerns not only the importance of "safe assets," but also the role of the repo market failure in precipitating further financial market instability. I ran into a paper by Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov that provides new data and presents a revisionist take on the role of repo in the shadow banking system. Here are some principal quotes:


The table also details the amount of these securities financed by repo. Total repo of non-Agency MBS/ABS is $171bn. Even if we include the repo extended against corporate bonds, the repo total is only $386bn. This is a small fraction of the out- standing assets of shadow banks. This observation underscores a principal finding of this study: repo was of far less importance in funding the shadow-banking sector than is commonly assumed.
If repo was not the principal source of funding, what was? The table details the direct holdings of these securities by MMFs and security lenders. The direct holdings are substantial, totaling $745bn. It is likely that such holdings are high grade and short maturity tranches of securitization deals...

First, while in their data average haircuts are frequently zero in 2007 for corporate debt and securitized products, the repos undertaken by MMF in our data always have average haircuts of at least 2%, even for Treasuries and Agency debt. Second, although our value-weighted averages (which is the most relevant measure of aggregate funding conditions) are difficult to compare with the equal-weighted averages in finer categories reported in Gorton and Metrick (2011b), an informal comparison suggests that haircuts in tri-party repos of MMF increased much less than the haircuts in their bilateral repo data (Gorton and Metrick report average haircuts in excess of 50% for several categories of corporate debt and securitized products).

Taken together with our findings of the relatively small amounts of MMF repos against private-label MBS and ABS collateral, these observations suggest that the “run on repo” may have had a more modest effect on aggregate funding conditions for the shadow banking system than what one may guess from the enormous increase in haircuts for securitized products in the bilateral repo market as reported by Gorton and Metrick (2011b)...

 This finding does not support the emphasis that Gorton and Metrick (2010, 2011b, 2011a) and Adrian and Shin (2010) have placed on the repo market in explaining the collapse of the shadow banking system. Instead, the short-term funding of securitized assets through ABCP and direct investments by money market investors are an order of magnitude larger then repo funding, and the contraction in ABCP is an order of magnitude larger than the run on repo. Troubles in funding securitized assets with repo may have been a major factor in the problems of some dealer banks that were most heavily exposed to these assets, but for the shadow banking system as a whole, the role of the repo market appears small.



These results are in strong contrast to Gary Gorton's work, which has focused on the bilateral repo market. His research suggested that the financial crisis could be understood as a bank run similar to past financial crises, as in the 1930s. However, in this case, the bank run simply came instead to the shadow banking system in the form of the repo market closing up. The implication is that much of the fallout in the last several years can be understood using the same framework for why maturity mismatch induces normal banks to face runs.

The results from Krishnamurthy and company are in some tension with this interpretation. Repo by itself seems to have constituted a small share of financing in the shadow banking system. Correspondingly, the "run" on repo had little impact on aggregate bank financing systems (though painful for certain individual banks). The run was concentrated on repos collateralized by private label AAA securities, not on repos in general. Even risky banks were able to obtain repo financing by collateralizing with different securities.

Meanwhile, repo haircuts for some assets mirror their levels during the crisis. This seems inconsistent with the idea that the crisis involved some extraordinary and temporary run, as opposed to a general shift in the attitude towards the risk of certain assets.

To be sure, the results are specific to repo supplied by dealers and money-market-mutual funds. It seems likely that their financing supply remained more inelastic throughout the crisis compared to financing between banks, which decreased dramatically in response to a credit crunch environment.

It's interesting to compare this narrative with Ivashina and Scharfstein, who argue that new bank lending had begun to decline in 2007Q3, well before the turmoil in repo/shadow banks became more pronounced. A GNI approach to the economy shows stagnation in this period as well, while mortgage defaults were starting to kick in.

One story consistent with all of this would emphasize the role of deteriorating productivity and credit conditions throughout the crisis, combined with a shadow-bank driven monetary crunch in 2008. Stagnating income for a substantial period of time induced higher levels of household borrowing; defaults on which triggered bank retrenching. In turn, this induced short-term financing effects that were important, but largely limited to inter-bank financing. The bank repo effect, however, comes with a money multiplier that continued to further amplify the crisis.

Thursday, September 1, 2011

To Fix Bank of America: Rules not Discretion


Despite Warren Buffet's interventions, The troubles at Bank of America seem large. Over concerns of rising credit losses and lawsuit risk, the company’s stock has plummeted, while the price of credit default swaps to protect against default have risen.
Henry Blodget, at Business Insider, offers a plan to fix Bank of America:

First, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner needs to set a "trigger price" for Bank of America stock. If Bank of America stock falls through this trigger price, he will then automatically put this plan into action…
·  Write down the value of Bank of America's assets by whatever it takes to make the balance sheet bombproof—focusing on second mortgages, commercial real-estate, European obligations, goodwill, and other "assets" that the market is skeptical about.
·  "Haircut" the unsecured creditors by whatever amount is necessary to close the gap between the asset writedown and the equity (BOFA currently has $222 billion of equity, so there's a lot to work with).
·  Inject $300 billion (or some multiple of the asset write-off) of fresh capital into the bank in the form of preferred and common stock—enough to make the bank extremely well-capitalized.

His prescription has much in common with several bank resolution strategies like  speed bankruptcy and a new bankruptcy chapter code. The common thread through these solutions is a reliance on a rules-based system for handling bank liabilities that would place the bulk of the burden on the holders of junior liabilities like equity and junior debt. These would be written off or written down in order to facilitate an orderly recapitalization under new management.
Of course, it remains to be seen what sort of credit losses Bank of America will ultimately bear. It may well the case that the company will manage without any writedowns. However, given the importance that Bank of America has on the larger economy, it’s essential to have in place a viable back up option.
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely, however, that Geithner and colleagues will actually follow the rules-based back up outlined above. Instead, if Bank of America requires a bailout, it will happen in a similar manner to the bailouts during the financial crisis — which were ad hoc and driven by regulatory discretion.
New revelations from the Fed reveal the extensive nature of those bailouts. In response to inquiries from Bloomberg news, the Fed has revealed the existence of loans offered to major financial institutions. These loans may be defended on the grounds that such lending fits with the Fed’s mandate as a central bank, and were essential to allowing  the financial system to weather the panic. However, the lack of transparency that surrounded their disbursement and the quality of the assets used as collateral is certainly troubling.
This new discovery helps make sense of a research finding by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and colleagues. In a paper, this group found that Geithner’s appointment was associated with stock gains among companies with close ties to Geithner. These gains were not present among financial firms generally — suggesting that connections, rather than Geithner’s performance as Treasury Secretary, drove these firms profits. Interestingly, this same group of companies suffered as Geithner’s tax problems led to lengthy confirmation battle.
The overall pattern in the last several years has brought new waves of crony capitalism to the foreground. Firms have received loans and bailouts in line with personal connections, and have seen their share values fluctuate in proportion with the career prospects of individual bureaucrats. Dodd-Frank enshrines this discretion-based approach into law, and does not auger well for the creation of a functioning financial system. Instead, we need a financial system based on rules. Bank of America could be a good place to start depending how the market value of its liabilities and equity hold up over the coming weeks.

Monday, August 22, 2011

Are Capital Markets Inherently Risky?

A new NBER paper by Michael Bordo, Angela Redish, and Hugh Rockoff look further into the causes of the superior performance of the Canadian Banking system:

The financial crisis of 2008 engulfed the banking system of the United States and many large European countries. Canada was a notable exception. In this paper we argue that the structure of financial systems is path dependent. The relative stability of the Canadian banks in the recent crisis compared to the United States in our view reflected the original institutional foundations laid in place in the early 19th century in the two countries. The Canadian concentrated banking system that had evolved by the end of the twentieth century had absorbed the key sources of systemic risk—the mortgage market and investment banking—and was tightly regulated by one overarching regulator. In contrast the relatively weak, fragmented, and crisis prone U.S. banking system that had evolved since the early nineteenth century, led to the rise of securities markets, investment banks and money market mutual funds (the shadow banking system) combined with multiple competing regulatory authorities. The consequence was that the systemic risk that led to the crisis of 2008 was not contained.

The superior performance of the Canadian banking system relative to the American one is a well-known fact in the banking literature. The decision by various populists and other forces to regulate American banking in a poor manner remains one of the single largest unforced errors in American economy history. Branch restrictions and other regulations led to a large fragmentation in the American banking sector, while Canadian banks were relatively more centralized. This meant that American banks were strongly undercapitalized and unable to deal with localized geographic agricultural shocks -- leading to chronic bank runs.

Canada avoided that. Even in the Great Depression, they largely avoided bank failure. Nor did they have deposit insurance until the 1960s. So it's not that the maturity transformation that banks do is inherently risky; or that financial systems are inherently prone to collapse. Instead, Canada just opted for a more stable, nationally centralized system that performed much better historically.

This paper adds to that knowledge by pointing out another key factor extending Canada's banking performance - the role of capital markets. American banks compensated for their geographical fragmentation by creating liquid capital markets on which to trade debt and other contracts.

The authors argue that this led to something of an inbuilt American national bias to rely on capital markets -- culminating recently with structured products like mortgage-backed securities. In Canada, comparable lending is still handled by banks extending loans to individuals. "Shadow banks" like Investment Banks have always been around in the US underwriting commercial paper or other offerings. These markets frequently failed during crises.

Interestingly, this difference also pops up in Japan, which I discussed here. The old Japanese school of Finance relied extensively on bank finance through the 80s. At that point, there was a large deregulatory shift in favor of capital markets, and also a financial crisis. That evidence isn't necessarily causal, but it is perhaps another reason to think that banking-oriented finance, as opposed to capital market-oriented finance, may have some advantages.