Showing posts with label tech. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tech. Show all posts

Thursday, February 4, 2010

Ubiquitous Computing

I've been puzzled in talking to people about the iPad. Even people generally tech-savvy and fans of Apple (which, regrettably, I'm slowly morphing into) are fairly against the iPad. "It doesn't have Flash!" they say. "I already have an X, Y, and Z. What do I do with this?"

Well, tablets are going to become a new "screen" in our lives, much as the iPod created a space for music players and the iPhone did for smart phones. As with those other things, Apple won't have the only tablet in town. This device moves us much further down the path of ubiquitous computing--you will have several of these tablets lying around the house. It doesn't matter which device you choose, you'll still be able to access your various needs--documents, email--on the internet cloud. Reserve a movie? Check. Weather? Check. Newspapers; magazines. You will never go far without some sort of computing device near you.

Yet, at the same time that computing envelops our lives, computers will become more transparent and invisible than ever. This is the same transition that cars went through. When cars first came out, you basically had to be a mechanic to use one. Now, everyone drives cars without thinking too much about it. Cars themselves have become much more advanced, but they've become steadily easier to operate. If you really want, you can still tinker with them; but that's mostly a preserve of specialists.

The computer, too, is seeing a transition in which more and more of its functions are going "under the hood" to make it easier for the end user; while things get ever more complicated on the back end. To hear fanboys complain about this is a bit like hearing gearheads complain about how people use automatic transitions.

This gets us to a point where even a baby can navigate an iPhone. This raises some interesting questions. We also know chimps and some other animals are about as intelligent as babies. Can chimps use iPhones and iPads? Would they ever have any desire to take and share photographs of each other? Would this ever go anywhere?

Sunday, January 31, 2010

Kindlenomics

Amazon is trying to reset the price point of eBooks to $9.99--much like Apple did at $.99 for songs. Though Slate bizarrely thinks that ebooks somehow violate the laws of demand, it's easy to see why--Amazon can drive up volume at the lower price, which has two effects:

1) Convince more people to buy a Kindle on the margin, so you increase the number of eBook customers
2) Amazon gets a bigger piece of the eBook market, which they can maintain over time through network effects (you can read Amazon's ebooks anywhere in the cloud, but their books don't play well with other books, and you don't get any DRM rights).

The publishers are stonewalling this move, and so Amazon loses money on most eBooks it sells. With the iBook market starting out at $15, they now have another excuse to avoid passing on savings to customers.

The odd thing here is that this must be the only market in which competition is raising prices. If Amazon didn't have the clout it did in online retail, it would probably be forced to go along with Apple and the publishers at the higher price point as well. As it is, you can expect the average eBook to cost more now that Apple is in the market.

Update: Looks like Amazon has caved in. Apple has taken on a monopoly, and consumers are worse off. It really can't be emphasized enough how much publishers are hurting their readers here. Fortunately, eBooks are going to destroy their gateway status and their industry will (some day) collapse.


Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Apple v. Amazon

Fights between big name tech giants is always entertaining, much like fights between late-night talk show hosts. In some sense, Apple's new iPad is a direct shot at Amazon's Kindle. It's cheapest version isn't much more expensive than Amazon's most expensive model and does much more beyond books.

But really, the two are playing different games. Apple is really setting up its book store, magazine tie-ins, and exclusive app environment to make purchasing its device more attractive. Amazon has a Kindle app for the iPhone that works on the iPad. The Kindle was a great way to create the eBook market, but ultimately Amazon doesn't care what device you use to read their books. Apple's about the hardware; Amazon does retail.

But if there's anything Apple has shown us these past several years; it's that hardware is where the money is. Apple's iTunes didn't make much money, but was a great boost for iPod sales. The world of digital retail is fiercely competitive, and prices trend towards cost--which is to say zero. The world of consumer electronics has brands and margins.

But whatever tough times Amazon faces in the future, the newspapers are far worse off. They've pinned whatever last hopes they have to this device. But what percent of people will actually buy one, and what percent of them will pony up for a brand new subscription to the NYT? This is mass delusion. If they really want to save their business, they need to destroy privacy, collect data, and put up targeted ads. Whatever they think, advertising--not subscription--has always driven the newspaper industry (newspaper subscriptions in the past just covered the cost of paper and printing); all the internet has done is shown how horribly inefficient advertising is.

Thursday, October 23, 2008

Tail Events

The financial crisis has gotten many people interested in the possibility of really bad, really low probability systemic risk. This is not a new idea; people like Nassim Taleb and Mandelbrot have discussed for some time the ways in which financial returns follow non-normal distributions, a fact which is difficult to determine from existing data.

Of course, volatility in equities has been driven by systemic risk in the financial sector. Brunnermeier, whose work I've talked a lot about, goes into some length in explaining how links between financial firms generate strong cycles and network effects. And of course connected networks are going to display the usual non-linear chaotic symptoms. This is not really new either; Friedman based his advocacy for strong government intervention in the financial sector in times of crisis exactly on such network arguments (of course, the argument also supported the claim that governments are 'bad,' which never really made sense; either the government is a malevolent actor and ought be eradicated, or else it is an imperfect one and should be made better).

My point is just that none of this is exclusive to stocks or finance generally. There are plenty of tail risks out there founded on network connections with enormous consequences. People have a really hard time grasping this cognitively--I know I do--and the urge to compartmentalize and reduce really prevents people from understanding or planning for these events. Nor does historical data help that much, especially since historical data is biased against existential risks.

I still don't understand that last point, but it's really big for considering the biggest such "unknown unknown"--nuclear war. So we've been really close to nuclear war on several occasions. Eisenhower's deputies tried to "normalize" the use of nuclear weapons, while of course there was Cuba (where tactical nukes were deployed by Russians with standing orders to retaliate against a military strike by the US, and standing orders for the US military at one point dictated an invasion). Other interesting events include Petrov, Arkhipov, at least one recorded case of near Soviet missile firing, and so forth. The possibility of bad signaling, faulty equipment, false signal, etc etc is disturbingly high. Nixon tried the "I'm an unpredictable actor" approach, but from the Soviet point of view (not the American) there were actually rational reasons for him to act scary. This is also all very systemic, as many bad things are likely to happen in unison. MAD works well enough in the long-run, but the tail risks are very bad. India-Pakistan is of course the same situation without response time. What is particularly scary about that is that at least some Pakistani military leadership believe they could genuinely come out ahead in a nuclear exchange.

The really bad thing about tail risks in this scenario is that they really are martingales, but the inevitable bad event is existential exhaustion. That is, the probability of total collapse multiplies across, so even if in every period there is a really low probability of a really bad event, that bad event will happen eventually. So most civilizations collapse eventually. But of course, before globalization, collapses had only local effects. Eventually, some collapse will take all of us down.

What such a record of near-misses should tell a Bayesian who believes in many-worlds is that "we" are the survivors of quantum suicide. The nature of quantum suicide is that if you risk your life, the universe "splits" into some in which you die and others in which you life, and of course you are sentient and alive only in certain universes. So, our status as alive, sentient beings is powerful information about the state of all worlds. That is, we live in a reasonably representative universe which has escaped the tail risk of nuclear holocaust, and are quickly heading towards the "miraculous" universe which escapes in the nick of time every time--at least, we are most likely to be conscious of that state of affairs. I like to think of this as the Golan Trevize universe.

Another way of saying this is that you should not be "surprised" that you live in a populous nation, in a populous country, and so forth, because likely you are a "representative" person in terms of where your sentience ends up. There are other statistical likelihoods you can deduce from this position. For one, it is unlikely that mankind will last much longer in present form or present population. After all, if we continue dodging tail risks, then presumably we will continue expanding as fact we can as organisms do. The sum total of humans who have ever lived will be really large; and the probability of us being born around now really small (of course, there are still plenty of people around now, and maybe we are exactly a low probability tail event). So our best probability estimates suggest that either the human population drops pretty rapidly from now (then we find ourselves near the mean population, historically distributed, where we expect to be) or else we are a type of consciousness that achieves a maximum around now. So our best estimes suggest a singularity or total extinction soonish.

I suppose it makes sense that I'm "reflecting" about all of this. How does age enter into this; should we expect to live more about as long as we have? That doesn't make a lot of sense, so either this is all wrong it's more proof of the "nowness" of now.

But a naive estimate of the total "intelligences" available across all universes has to be pretty large, right? Even a low-ball estimate for ET balloons pretty quickly, and the rare Earth hypothesis does not seem particularly likely given the total ease at which life spreads. After all, if life can thrive here, where can't it develop? So something seems wrong. Intelligence ought to be spread all over the universe, and intelligence should beget more and more intelligence through robotic means if nothing else. So, given that you must, by virtue of the fact that "you" are a being with experience and sentience, why this particular sentient being, given that sentience ought to be everywhere? Perhaps--again--we are a tail event. Or we are a type of sentience only found among certain intelligences. But the probability of being a type of intelligence is a probability like any other, and we ought to expect to be a representative intelligence. So--shouldn't we be that much smarter? Is this really the mean intelligence level out there? That's kind of sad--we've only really been thinking for a few centuries. Or maybe we are some of the "ants" of the intelligence world, and just really numerous, while the truly high intelligence folks hog a certain few states?

So I suspect that the tail events I've been discussing both make it extremely unlikely for intelligence to form--so we are very historically contingent--and also very quickly kill off (or else singularitize and make scarce) more advanced intelligences. Looking through Earth's history, there is no real fitness advantage to high g. Plenty of animals have succeeded with many strategies, but even bonobos are nearly extinct. Like a laser which depends on certain light particles escaping and then amplifying, I suspect that it's really, really hard to evolve intelligence; but once it comes up, it grows quickly. As it grows however, it rapidly develops for itself contagious, fat tailed risk and wipes itself out across most of the universes it occupies. Of course, I'm testing the joint hypothesis of extinction and singularity. Not that this could be "tested," except in a sufficiently advanced simulation.

But of course any advanced intelligence "should" develop such a simulation, and the total possible number of intelligence states is going to be far greater in the simulation than in the "original"--whatever that means. So we should expect to be in a simulation. And what is the distribution of the owners? Perhaps they are malevolent or nice, but most likely they are simply apathetic. Much the same way that "junk" DNA rapidly overtakes the rest, the efficiently copying and haphazard simulators ought to be the ones generating the most states of affairs (How well does the multiverse hold up in a simulation? Hopefully they are nice enough to keep the seed number for future reference or recurrence (in some meta-probablistic sense, don't we have to be recurrent? After all, recurrent events happen infinitely often, while non-recurrent ones only finitely, so we simply have to be recurrent for the same reason that you will never pick up the exact number one when drawing from a continuum distribution from zero to two)). If you want a clear policy takeaway, we could be more concerned about maintaining the robustness of human survival to inevitable extreme events. Asteroids and all of that.

Let me check in the morning if this makes any sense.

Thursday, September 4, 2008

The Apple Killer?

There's been a lot of buzz over Google's new browser, which marks Google's most recent step to directly piss off Microsoft.  Like Google's earlier attacks--Google Docs/Spreadsheets, aimed at Microsoft Office, a partnership with Yahoo!--this one aims directly at a core Microsoft monopoly with the goal of radically changing how people do things with computers.  We will now all live and work on a virtualized internet Cloud, right next to Google's plan for actually making money from any of this.  

Seriously though; this looks to more like an attack against Apple than Microsoft.  The more Google succeeds in getting people to embrace internet-based apps, and blurring the link between their work and their hardware, doesn't that make people more likely to view their entire hardware/software system as a commodity, much the way Microsoft succeeded in delinking hardware and software in the 80s?  And the result of that move was to turn hardware into a commodity, which people purchase on the basis of price and performance.  Apple nearly died from that change, and is now sustained by price-insensitive hipsters and the iPod.  

So in a world in which you do everything online, and Macs and PCs are completely compatible, why would you ever use a Mac?  They're more "reliable," sure.  Maybe more user-friendly.  But you're paying more and more for that ever diminishing difference, as PC makers get better and you do more things online.  If you end up doing the same thing on a Mac as a PC, with the same probability of crashing, there's no reason to pay more for the Mac.