Showing posts with label military. Show all posts
Showing posts with label military. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

For Wars Before Being Against Them

I'm not always a fan of Robert Kagan, but he's right about this:
There is a new doctrine out there that seems to enjoy enormous cache among the smart foreign policy set: fight wars until they get hard, then quit. Vice President Biden seems to be a leading proponent of this approach. While a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Biden backed the Iraq War and spent the first few years after 2003 rightly calling on the Bush administration to send more troops. But when Bush finally wriggled himself free from the disastrous strategies of Donald Rumsfeld, Biden declared the situation hopeless and called instead for breaking up Iraq into three pieces. He then proceeded to oppose the very troop increase he had so long, and so courageously, fought for. And, of course, in opposing the surge, he had the whole foreign policy establishment on his side, epitomized by the wise people of the Baker-Hamilton commission.

Congress is brilliant at never taking responsibility. Its members always voted for the war before they voted against it -- in Vietnam, in Iraq and in Afghanistan. The foreign policy establishment and intellectual world are much the same. They fully supported intervention in Vietnam, mostly supported intervention in Iraq and fully supported the war in Afghanistan -- until the wars got hard, or embarrassing and difficult to defend in polite company. Then they bailed, desperately trying to cover their tracks along the way, and offering reassuring images of what losing would look like.
People who oppose interventions on principle, I can stand. People who love war, and continue to support it when the war is going poorly, I can stand. People like Biden--I'd love to play poker with them. They're the types who check till the river then fold.

Afghanistan is a tricky case. Obviously, you have to invade. This is, after all, the good war. But I'm not convinced by these arguments that the focus on Iraq destroyed the war effort. The timing isn't quite right; Afghanistan seems to have gotten worse around 2005ish due to several factors, many of them domestic. The country continued to enjoy a steady supply of US aid. A counterfactual in which it received a lot more in the way of help may have been better; but the extent to which the US "bailed out" has been exaggerated.

How would a Biden who didn't invade Iraq deal with Afghanistan? Invade, set up shop, watch the place burn down, and then leave? Suppose you went back and told this guy the inevitable failure of this strategy. Well, he would still have to invade Afghanistan. And the war effort would still probably have failed, due to forces outside Biden's control.

I don't think either Party is seriously engaging this issue. The Democrats believe that it was good to invade Afghanistan; the US should have set up a government there; but Bush's faults can explain all of the problems. I don't think they've thought through the implications of what you do about a war that's both necessary and highly likely to fail. The Republicans want to surge everything.

Someday, we'll get into another conflict. This will enjoy broad support from all Americans. Then it will get hard, and people will bail. This is a crappy way to run a foreign policy. Go all in or go home.

We should just get Putin to run our foreign policy. Can you believe this guy? He's running a second-tier power, at best, yet runs circles around everyone else. He's always a couple of steps ahead. Can you imagine what he'd do with American-style power?

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

If Only Afghanistan Were Vietnam

From Obama's Afghanistan speech:
First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabilized, and we're better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing. I believe this argument depends on a false reading of history. Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border. To abandon this area now -- and to rely only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance -- would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.
Yet it would be great if Afghanistan were another Vietnam. In the popular imagination, there is a straight line from the Tet Offensive to US withdrawal from Saigon. Yet seven years separated those two events. In between, American and Vietnamese forces virtually eradicated the Viet Cong resistance within South Vietnam. There's really no dispute about this point.

The so-called "revisionists" think that South Vietnam could still have held after that point had US support continued against North Vietnamese (backed by the Soviet bloc) attacks. Whatever you think of this view, it's undoubtedly true that what ultimately ended the Vietnam war was the invasion of another sovereign country. The insurgency--while potent--was ended through exactly the sort of counter-insurgency tactics rediscovered in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Obviously, this need not imply that those same tactics work in Afghanistan. But that's exactly my point. It would be great if Afghanistan were more like Vietnam, where counter-insurgency worked. It's the fact that it isn't like Vietnam that's causing all the trouble.

Thursday, November 19, 2009

The Maginot Line

Here's super-investor Bill Gross on what it feels like to hold cash:
My point is to recognize, and to hope that you recognize, that an effective zero percent interest rate, as a price for hiding in a foxhole, is prohibitive. Like the American doughboys near France’s Maginot line in WWII – slumping day after day in a muddy, rat-infested pit – when the battalion commander finally blew his whistle to charge the enemy lines, it probably was accompanied by some sense of relief; anything, anything but this! Anything but .01%!
Leaving aside the WWI-WWII confusion, it's a very common perception to think that the Maginot line "didn't work", and the French deluded themselves by focusing on the past and hunkering down, while the Nazis sped forward through blitzkrieg.

It's true that the French battle plan didn't quite work out. But the Maginot line was actually a pretty good idea. Yes, the Germans could evade it by flanking and invading Belgium. But that was the whole point of the line. Instead of dealing with the Germans on home soil, you force them into Benelux, where the combined forces of the British, French, and million-odd Belgian and Dutch forces could bog the Germans down.

The initial German plan was forced by the Maginot line to play out exactly this way. Had that invasion happened, the Germans would have met vastly superior French armor and quite possibly would have dug in to another WWI-like stalemate. It was a phenomenal stroke of luck that resulted in the Germans switching to a plan that cut into the seemingly-impassable Ardennes to cut off the body of the Allied force in Belgium, more luck that the French failed to realize and respond to that, and yet more luck that French tanks didn't have enough gas.

But the Maginot Line itself worked exactly as intended, and could have won the war five years early had it not been for von Manstein and company.

Sunday, November 1, 2009

Privatized Flying Armies of Robotic Killer Assassins Found Problematic

This week's New Yorker is actually pretty good. Gladwell's piece on football and dog fighting has gotten a lot of attention, but Jane Mayer also has a good article on the Predator Drone program:
It’s easy to understand the appeal of a “push-button” approach to fighting Al Qaeda, but the embrace of the Predator program has occurred with remarkably little public discussion, given that it represents a radically new and geographically unbounded use of state-sanctioned lethal force. And, because of the C.I.A. program’s secrecy, there is no visible system of accountability in place, despite the fact that the agency has killed many civilians inside a politically fragile, nuclear-armed country with which the U.S. is not at war. Should something go wrong in the C.I.A.’s program—last month, the Air Force lost control of a drone and had to shoot it down over Afghanistan—it’s unclear what the consequences would be.
There are some ethical questions here, and a tradeoff between security and the consequences of extrajudicial assassination. As well as interesting psychological problems created by having people go to war during the day and come home to their families at night.

But what's also interesting is that using air power to conduct counterinsurgency is not new; it's not even new in Afghanistan. From Wikipedia:

Following the end of World War I and the accompanying British defence cuts, the newly-independent RAF took up the task of policing the British Empire from the air. It was argued that the use of air power would prove to be a more cost-effective way of controlling large areas than by using conventional land forces. Sir Hugh Trenchard, the Chief of the Air Staff, had formulated ideas about the use of aircraft in colonial policing and these were first put into practice in 1920 when the RAF and imperial ground units defeated rebel Somaliland dervishes. The following year, in 1921, the RAF was given responsibility for all British forces in Iraq with the task of 'policing' the tribal unrest. The RAF also saw service in Afghanistan in 1928, when following the outbreak of civil war, the British Legation and some European diplomatic staff based in Kabul were cut off. The operation to rescue them, the Kabul Airlift, was the first evacuation of civilians by air.

Arguably, the pacification of these areas by the British shows how purely air-based strategies can work. On the other hand, the fact that America is still fighting in tribal conflicts in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq--essentially, taking over previous British entanglements--suggests that these are not good long-term solutions.

Friday, October 16, 2009

Vietnam Revisionism, Iraq, and Afghanistan

Lexington reminds me to bring up a vastly under-discussed topic: Vietnam Revisionism.

Counterinsurgency broke the news after Petraeus and McChrystal, but it was actually very big in the popular and military imagination during the '60s as well. Mao's success in China sparked a huge discussion of how to conduct and defeat insurgency. For obvious reasons, the Vietnam War continued this trend.

Reading A Better War, a classic revisionist account of Vietnam, is like looking at Iraq all over again. The initial commanders in both wars--Westmoreland in Vietnam, Tommy Franks and others in Iraq--were basically clueless about how to tackle local insurgency. Westmoreland, for instance, focused on body counts and firepower. He threw artillery and air power at guerrillas, and focusing on winning battles. He exuded optimism and threw out made-up statistics during press conferences. As in Iraq, this led nowhere.

Then you had new generals in both wars. In Vietnam, General Abrams came in. He replaced "search-and-destroy" missions with ones focused on "clear-and-hold" to implement a policy of civilian defense. He focused more on training native Vietnamese units. This coincided with Nixon's "surge" strategy of escalating the conflict to leave on better terms. The dramatic change in policy as a result of following counterinsurgency doctrine and the dramatic change in the outcome of the war in America's are not in question. Needless to say, the surge under Petraeus and Odierno, and the shift in American doctrine towards COIN, was a similar story.

The disputed part about Vietnam Revisionism is whether Abrams' efforts were enough to win the war in the long run. North Vietnam enjoyed enormous support from Communist states, while Congress eventually killed all military aid to South Vietnam. In the Revisionist counterfactual, limited military aid would have allowed an insurgency-free South Vietnam to sustain direct attacks from North Vietnam.

I think a fairly convincing argument can be made for that scenario. But in any event; there are better and worse ways of fighting insurgencies, and it takes a while to develop the competency and leadership capable of fighting them.

The success of counterinsurgency in Vietnam and Iraq doesn't imply that it will work in Afghanistan, a very different country. Nor will it tell you if Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan were ultimately worth fighting. Just because a given tactic can win a war doesn't mean the war is worthwhile.

But from the point of view of South Vietnam, at any rate, it probably was. South Vietnam remained mired in poverty for twenty years after its war, while it enjoyed growth under a free market before the war, and would probably have enjoyed even greater success had it won the war--something like a North Korea/South Korea analogue (I might even go so far as to say that if you think the Korean war was worth fighting, than you should have supported South Vietnam in 1975, even if you opposed sending troops in during the 60s).

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Petraeus, Don't Betray Us

Ever since the last election, I've kept an eye on the 2012 race. Like many people, my attention has been mainly on current and former Republican governors--Mitch Daniels, Pawlenty, Jindal, Huckabee, Romney --who could plausibly run as pragmatic technocrats focusing on fiscal prudence and competence in governance.

Intrade has another possible pick--Petraeus is trading at just under a ten percent chance at the Republican nomination.

This would be pretty interesting. Republicans have a long history of nominating war heroes and generals--basically every nominee from Eisenhower to McCain was a general, war hero, war President, or played a war hero in Hollywood. Bush 2000 and Nixon are a couple of exceptions. The military is one of the most admired institutions, and Petraeus in particular is highly regarded.

Moreover, unlike some past candidates--Colin Powell--Petraeus is fairly political. He's great with the press, worked some serious politics to get to where he is today, and is on the record as expressing interests in the Presidency. Sure, half of Congress probably has Presidential interests depending on the day of the week, but it's a little rarer in the military.

He isn't known for any sentiments on domestic policy, but that's exactly his promise. It means no long record of incriminating or flip-flopping statements, so can enter the campaign with a blank slate. People will project whatever they want onto him, so he can be all things to all people until he gets elected (sounds familiar...). I'm sure he's a smart guy--put him in the room with a few advisors, and he'll learn everything he needs to.

Of course, the nominee, and winner, in 2012 will be determined by future events we can't predict. But it is possible to sketch out the path in which Petraeus would do very well:

The economy keeps getting worse. Debt keeps rising. Obama exits Afghanistan, and things get worse there and in Pakistan. Terrorists strike somewhere. People perceive the government as corrupt and ineffectual; and its stance on national security as weak.

Petraeus steps in as the candidate of authority. His patriotism and competence are beyond question. It really doesn't matter what he says, as long as he comes off as reasonably intelligent and competent. This would be another Obama-like "branded" campaign, in which the overall image and tone of the candidate overshadows everything else. McCain tried to run something like this (Country First), and almost won (and would still have won if not for the post-Lehman collapse. I'm surprised I don't see more conspiracy theories/spite about that.).

Can you imagine trying to run attack ads against a successful war general? Not fun. All of the other potential Republican candidates have pissed off someone else in the camp at some point or another. Petraeus is arguably the only Republican alive who earns the respect, if not the outright adulation, of not only most Republicans, but many others as well.

Of course, if things turn out differently--the economy gets better, the wars end up going well--there will be much less space for a Petraeus candidacy. Either way, civilian-military relations seem be decidedly chillier under Obama, and it'll be interesting to see how this plays out.

Monday, October 12, 2009

Graveyard of Empires

One thing you hear all of the time is that "Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires". It's taken down everyone from Alexander the Great to the British to the Soviets, so America should probably stay away. Or else just go in all the way just to prove how America is so amazing.

Well, check out the history of Afghanistan on Wikipedia. You'll see that Alexander the Great conquered Afghanistan (then Bactria) just fine, and Greeks ran empires in the region for hundreds of years. Other successful conquerors include the Persians, Scythians, Mongols, Arabs, Sikhs... the list really goes on. Historically, Afghanistan has been the stepping-stone of empire rather than its graveyard.

It's true, the British had some setbacks there. But ultimately both the British and Russians had victories in the region.

But none of this answers the question of whether Afghanistan can be "won" today or not. Iraq, for instance, has historically been very easy to conquer; and, yes, any country today with a sizable standing army probably would have found it reasonably easy to both conquer and pacify Iraq. India or China, if either had the logistics capacities and local defense bases, could probably have done a decent job at it. But it proved to be very difficult for America today nonetheless.

The Soviets, for instance, found Afghanistan tough going--even though the Russians enjoyed some success there over a hundred years ago. The past is very poor at predicting the outcome of insurgency today. Not even the Soviet example is a perfect indicator of how things may go in Afghanistan, as things are very different. There are no Stinger missiles or foreign countries supplying insurgents today, for instance.

Rather than misreading inapplicable historical examples, it would be nice if the media offered some more cost-benefit analysis on this sort of foreign adventure. Here, I'm genuinely agnostic: cutting and running would seriously hurt counter-terrorist operations, but even total success is not worth an infinite amount of money and lives. It seems silly to skimp and scrounge for every last penny on a health reform bill, but then say that because this particular war seems good in comparison to a pretty lousy one, it's worth throwing no end to money towards it.

It also seems odd to slam McChrystal for behaving as a neo-MacArthur in demanding more troops for the mission. Isn't that what Shinseki did before the Iraq War, before getting fired and then applauded for his willingness to speak up? It's probably true in both cases that generals shouldn't be the final determinants of troop levels (at least in wars of choice), because they aren't in a position to weigh the benefits of more troops with costs elsewhere. But really that's just a reason to stop engaging in wars of choice, so that these issues will stop rearing up.

The news already does a pretty poor job of covering international news; maybe if they finally do a poor enough job, no one will care, and these sorts of wars will stop happening.

Monday, April 6, 2009

Defense Cuts

If Gates gets away with his sweeping budget cuts in Defense spending, I'll be really happy. Cutting the F-22? Cutting white-knight, pie in the sky projects like the Future Combat Systems? Cutting missile defense spending? That's amazing. It'll be even more amazing if this can survive Congress.

Unfortunately, Defense spending is still going up, because spending on unconventional wars is rising. Obviously some of this is necessary for Afghanistan and Iraq. But how much of that reflects the conflicts America will get into after these wind down? One school of thought suggests that American strategic interests will demand future interventions in failing states to curb instability and terror. This is no doubt what will actually happen.

Alternatively, people could set 'Defense Priorities' with actual resources in mind. We could say that sending soldiers into every last rotten country around the globe doesn't represent an affordable goal. We could say that Europe and South Korea can shoulder their own defense needs on their own, instead of piggy-backing on American tanks. They also depend on American pharma research because they've destroyed their own industry with price controls, and need to be gifted iPods because their firms are too lazy and their consumers too complacent to develop technology.

Anyway, back to the point: Serious draw-downs in military spending will only happen when the last neoconservative is strangled with the entrails of the last humanitarian hawk.

Monday, February 23, 2009

Defense Spending and Libertarians

The political marriage between libertarians and conservatives has been good and bad; one of the bad bits is that it has virtually silenced libertarians on military spending.  It's not too much of an exaggeration to say that a substantial portion of the national debt is due directly to insane amounts of military spending.  The low-tax mantra from Reagan on cut revenue, but most domestic spending is virtually untouchable.  The big lever in government spending is Defense spending, which hovers along a 500 billion dollar range or so.  Committing to the lower part of this range over the past few decades would have lowered the debt by several trillion, with little tangible loss along the dimension of national interest.  

Persistent hawkishness--often from both parties--has escalated this spending without any concern for tangible military goals.  Instead of setting national priorities from the standpoint of military resources, there is a bizarre habit of deciding that tangental world events demand substantial military intervention, and an accompanying large military budget.  In a world of balancing coalitions and counterinsurgency, money spent this way ends up being basically counterproductive.  Come on, the US is basically a large island; it has no national interests or needs that can't be satisfied on $200 billion a year.  This urge to find futuristic robotic combat system and newer classes of enemies is a desperate attempt to remain relevant in a world in which American military capacity is basically not needed.  Whatever the possibility of future great-power conflict, economic growth is the best way to prepare for that.

Inter-deparment squabbles between Defense agencies worsens this situation.  The implicit agreement among agencies to divy up military pork evenly between them provides billions for the megalomaniac dreams of navy commands who build obsolete navy carriers and air force fighter jocks who are now trying to get the F-22 passed.

Democrats will often go through with this agenda because of their bias for interventionism--the Obama pledge to devote more resources to the "good war" in Afghanistan, posturing on Darfur, etc.  We all know where Republicans stand.  This is where libertarians really need to stand up.  It's not enough to rail against government spending; clearly both the composition and size of government spending matter, and it's far worse to spend hundreds of billions on defense then similar amounts of money on more productive goals.  The fact that defense is a broadly acceptable class of government spending for libertarians ignores the fact that marginal spending on the military is basically wasted.  

Things aren't going great in India either.  The defense budget just spiked 22%--largely a political response after the Mumbai attacks on eve of elections--even as the military can't spend their money, still devote staggering sums to personel and pensions (even the normal government has largely cleaned up their pension obligations, and apparently can't even mount a decent strike against Pakistan.   All of this is going on even as India has one of the world's worst budget deficit problems, and is headed to the point where the interest payments on debt alone threatens to overwhelm the budget.  That this is happening at all after years high growth in the tax base suggests the degree of financial incompetence of the UPA.  I'm still waiting for the political commentators to mention this, instead of going on and on about how the BJP are Hindu nationalist communalists, and the Gandhis are wonderfully progressive.